Abstract: Theory suggests that tort reform could have either of two impacts on accidents. First, reforms could increase accidents as tortfeasors internalize less of the costs of externalities, and thus, have less incentive to reduce the risk of accidents. Second, tort reforms could decrease accidents as lower expected liability costs result in lower prices, enabling consumers to buy more risk-reducing products such as medicines, safety equipment, and medical services. We test which effect dominates by examining the effect of tort reforms on non-motor vehicle accidental death rates, using panel data techniques. We find that caps on noneconomic damages, caps on punitive damages, a higher evidence standard for punitive damages, product liability reform, and prejudgment interest reform lead to fewer accidental deaths, while reforms to the collateral source rule lead to increased deaths. Overall, the tort reforms in the states between 1981-2000 have led to an estimated 14,222 fewer accidental deaths.
I. Introduction
Classical law and economics analysis of tort law treats torts as externalities. A well-functioning legal system creates incentives for potential tortfeasors to internalize the costs of the externalities by making them liable for damages if a tort actually occurs.
This leads to efficient behavior under many circumstances (Brown, 1973; Landes and Posner, 1987; Shavell, 1987 Shavell, , 2004 . As a result, any "tort reform" that reduces the scope of liability could increase accident risk as potential tortfeasors internalize fewer costs. 1 However, this premise depends on numerous assumptions. These include: damages are pecuniary, not non-pecuniary; injurers and victims are strangers, and not in any pre-accident contractual relationship; the system operates costlessly; and actions of tortfeasors are harmful, not protective. As modern liability has expanded to include product liability and medical malpractice, these assumptions are increasingly subject to challenge. Damages are now equally pecuniary and non-pecuniary, so that nonpecuniary damages (such as pain and suffering) are about one half of all damage payments (Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 2002) . For products liability and malpractice, victims and injurers are in a pre-injury contractual relationship. The system is very costly to operate, with estimates of costs and fees of up to 54% of total spending (TillinghastTowers Perrin, 2002) . Only $.22 of every dollar that goes through the tort system is returned to consumers for compensation for economic damages. Most importantly, many defendants in modern tort suits are actually engaged in reducing, not increasing, accident risk; this applies to makers of many products (medicines, protective equipment) and to physicians. 2 These factors operate together to challenge the very basis of tort law (Calfee and Rubin, 1992) . Because injurers and victims are in a contractual relationship, victims will pay for potential damage payments ex ante in the form of higher prices. The ex ante payments must cover not only pecuniary damages, but also non-pecuniary damages (which are damages for events that do not raise the marginal utility of wealth and which do not create a demand for insurance) and administrative costs. As prices increase, consumers become less willing to pay for the goods and services covered by tort law.
Suppliers may decide to stop supplying the goods and services altogether. And because many of these goods and services would reduce accident risk, increasing tort liability may actually lead to increased, not reduced, accident risk. Similarly, tort reforms that decrease tort liability and make risk-reducing products more available and affordable may reduce accident risk.
There are numerous real-world anecdotal examples of higher prices and lower supply of risk-reducing products forcing consumers to substitute to more dangerous products. For example, shortages of OB/GYN doctors in states with high liability costs result in less pre-natal care. Increasing prices for safer automobiles force some consumers to buy more dangerous motorcycles or drive older cars with fewer safety features. High prices for the safest child car seats force many consumers to buy lessexpensive and less-safe car seats. Increasing medicine prices mean that some poorly-2 For example, the American Trial Lawyers (ATLA) website lists "litigation groups," "voluntary associations of ATLA members sharing an interest in a particular type of case." As of April 18, 2005, there were 73 such groups; of these, 30 were directly related to health providers, including categories such as "birth trauma," "health care disability," "medical negligence," and "pharmacy liability." Thus, 40% of the insured consumers cannot afford to take medicine regularly. (For some evidence on this issue, see Manning, 1994) . Because liability costs are at least partially responsible for the high prices, our tort system may be responsible for increasing accident risk.
Many aspects of the tort system and tort reform have been studied in detail. It is common to use state data to examine various effects of tort reform on variables of interest. CBO (2004) provides a useful summary of this research. The general findings are that tort reform reduces the number of lawsuits and amount of damages, and has improved the profitability of insurance companies. Although no studies have examined the impact of tort reform on accidents, it is generally agreed by most economists that "…if the liability system has a real purpose today, it must lie in the creation of incentives to reduce risk" (Shavell, 2004, at 268) . If it does not reduce risk, then there is a real question about the social purpose of the modern American tort system. Thus, to evaluate the merits of the tort system and decide on the benefits of tort reform it is necessary to examine the impact of tort reform on accidents. This is what we do in this paper. Section II explores the theoretical relationship between tort reform and accidents. Section III tests the relationship by investigating the association between tort reform and accidental death rates. Section IV discusses implications and concludes.
II. The Link Between Tort Reform and Accidents
In this section, we explore the theoretical relationship between tort reform and accidents. We begin with a general discussion of the opposing effects of liability litigation groups represent health related providers; the share of health spending in the economy is about 15%. reduction on accidents. Then, we describe how some specific reforms should affect accidents.
A. Liability Reduction and Accidents
Although a few states have had reforms in place for several decades, the enactment of tort reforms increased dramatically in the mid-1980s in response to rising insurance costs (CBO, vii) .
3 Since 1986, states have enacted various combinations of tort reforms. Most state tort reforms are based on the premise that too many tort claims are filed and damage awards are too high. As a result, almost all reforms try to limit the number of cases filed or the damages awarded.
This reduction in expected liability may have two opposing effects on accidents.
First, it may increase accidents as tortfeasors internalize less of the cost of externalities, and thus, have less incentive to reduce the risk of accidents. Second, it may decrease accidents as lower liability costs result in lower prices and supply increases, enabling consumers to buy more risk-reducing products and services.
To explain the second effect, consider the following model. Assume that a product reduces the risk of a certain kind of accident. The accident has expected pecuniary losses of L p and expected nonpecuniary losses of L np . Assume the background risk of the accident is p b and the modified risk of the accident when using the safety product is p m . A consumer's valuation of the safety product, and hence, the amount they are willing to pay for the product, V c , is the marginal reduction in the probability of an accident multiplied by the total expected loss from the accident:
Assume that c is the cost of producing the safety product, and if a consumer has an accident when using the safety product, the probability that the manufacturer will be held liable for the losses is p l . The manufacturer is willing to sell the product for an amount V p that is no less than the cost of production plus the expected liability cost:
An informed consumer will be willing to purchase the product if V c ≥ V p .
Applying real numbers to the example, assume that the background risk of an accident, p b , is 0.00015 and the reduced risk of the accident when using the safety product, p m , is 0.0001 (a one-third reduction in risk). If an accident occurs, the expected pecuniary loss from the accident, L p , is $500,000 and the expected nonpecuniary loss from the accident, L np , is $3,000,000. The cost of producing the product is $20. Assume finally that, if a consumer has an accident when using the safety product, there is a 60% chance that the manufacturer will be liable for all losses.
The informed consumer is willing to pay up to V c = (.00015 -.0001) * ($500,000 + $3,500,000) = $175.
The informed producer is willing to sell the safety product for no less than: (Browne and Puelz, 1999; Yoon, 2001 ).
Other studies have established that lower liability costs result in lower prices. For example, Manning finds that that reductions in liability costs result in lower prices for both vaccines and prescription drugs (Manning, 1994; Manning, 1997) . Other studies find that tort reforms that reduce liability costs lower both medical malpractice premiums and general liability premiums (Viscusi, et. al., 1993; Born and Viscusi, 1994; Born and Viscusi, 1998; Thorpe, 2004; Viscusi and Born, 2005) . When suppliers pay lower premiums, they can pass along some of the savings to consumers by lowering the prices of goods and services. 4 Similarly, when high liability costs increase medical malpractice premiums, doctors pass along the costs by increasing prices. Consumers may be unable to afford the more expensive medical services, and medical insurance companies may not cover the services. As a result, some doctors may decide to leave states with high liability costs.
Several empirical studies find this result. Klick and Stratmann (2003) find that tort reforms, in general, lead to increased numbers of physicians in a state. Mello and Kelly (2005) find that many physicians decide not to locate in a jurisdiction (in their case, Pennsylvania) because of high malpractice premiums. They find this effect for many classes of physicians, including those in emergency medicine. They also find those physicians not leaving the state are less likely to practice high-risk specialties, including trauma care. Kessler et al. (2005) find an increase in the number of physicians in states that have adopted tort reform. In the specific case of emergency physicians, they find that "direct reforms led to increased growth in the supply of emergency medicine physicians of approximately 11.5%, almost 3 times the magnitude of the average nongroup effect of 3.9%." These findings may be particularly relevant for our analysis of accidental deaths, for a lack of emergency physicians will cause more accidents to lead to death.
B. Specific Tort Reforms
In the empirical section of our paper, we examine the relationship between accidental death rates and several different tort reforms: caps on noneconomic damages, caps on punitive damages, a higher evidence requirement for punitive damages, product liability reform, reforms to the prejudgment interest rule, reforms that allow courts to offset awards by the amount of collateral source payments, reforms that permit the admissibility of evidence of collateral source payments, or reforms to joint and several liability rules. We now describe each tort reform and the predicted effects of the reforms on death rates.
Noneconomic damages are damages for nonpecuniary losses such as pain and suffering, loss of consortium, emotional distress, and other intangible losses.
Nonpecuniary losses are real losses. However, in general they do not increase the marginal utility of wealth, and so consumers do not generally purchase insurance against this class of losses. Moreover, this class of damages involves no direct economic loss and has no precise value. Because of the intangibility of the losses and the lack of guidance from the courts on the value of the losses, jury awards for noneconomic damages are highly erratic. Proponents of tort reform claim that noneconomic damage caps would make the damages more predictable and reduce the excessiveness of the awards, promoting both more efficient deterrence and ease of settlement.
Punitive damages are awarded not to compensate plaintiffs, but to punish defendants for intentional and malicious conduct and to deter future conduct. Punitive awards are infrequent, but have increased in frequency and size in recent years. Similar to caps on noneconomic damages, tort reform proponents claim that caps are needed to make punitive damages more predictable and less excessive. Again, this should improve the settlement process and achieve more efficient deterrence. In most states, reforms to punitive damages have taken one of two forms: caps on punitive damages or higher evidence requirements before punitive damages are awarded. (The U.S. Supreme Court has also limited punitive damages, finding that in most cases a "single digit multiplier" is appropriate, so that punitive damages cannot be larger than 9 times actual damages.
)
Product liability law is intended to compensate consumers injured by defective products and deter manufactures from selling such products. Supporters of tort reform claim that many product liability laws do not send clear signals to manufacturers about how to avoid liability and hold manufacturers liable for defects that it was impossible for them to anticipate (ATRA, 41). They claim that manufacturers pass along liability risk to consumers in the form of higher prices, and often, manufacturers choose to quit producing certain products altogether to avoid liability. Product liability reform is meant to alleviate these problems by imposing certain limits on manufacturers' liability and eliminating absolute liability, replacing it with a rule requiring a product defect in order for a plaintiff to collect.
Prejudgment interest is interest that accrues on losses from the time of a tort to the time damages are paid. This interest is an actual cost to victims because if there had been no tort, then the victim could have earned interest. For example, a victim that covers his own medical costs until the injurer compensates him could have earned interest on the money. In addition, allowing prejudgment interest may encourage early settlements and reduce delay in the disposition of cases. However, tort reform proponents claim that allowing prejudgment interest can result in over-compensation and punish defendants for delays they may not have caused. Also, recall that economic damages make up only 22%
of total tort damages. Thus, most reforms limit the interest rate and include offers of judgment provision.
Collateral source rules prevent evidence to be admitted at trial that shows that a plaintiff's losses have been compensated by other sources, such as insurance or workers' compensation. Such rules promote efficient deterrence by requiring tortfeasors to pay damages even when victims have received payments from a collateral source. However, proponents of tort reform claim that collateral source rules promote double recovery and result in higher insurance premiums. Reforms to collateral source rules include allowing evidence of collateral source payments or completely offsetting awards by the amount of collateral source payments. The result is that injured parties will collect from their own insurance companies but injurers may not pay anything.
Joint and several liability means that any party who was involved in causing a tort may be responsible for the entire cost of the tort, no matter how small the contribution may be. Essentially, this allows plaintiffs to collect from "deep pockets" even if they were only marginal contributors. Although the standard rule protects the rights of plaintiffs to be fully compensated, it often fails to equitably distribute liability among defendants. It may also create an incentive for some defendants to settle to avoid becoming liable for the entire loss, leaving others, who may be almost entirely blameless, liable for large damages. Most reforms to the standard joint and several liability rules involve some sort of proportionate liability reform that limits exposure for those who played only a small part in causing the tort.
These tort reforms have the two opposing effects on accidents discussed in the previous subsection. That is, the reduction in liability should increase accident risk as potential tortfeasors internalize fewer costs. On the other hand, the reforms may decrease accident risk if they result in increased supply and lower cost of risk-reducing products or services, including medical care. Only empirical analysis will determine which effect dominates for each reform. 6 In most tort cases, the accident occurs in the state where both the plaintiff and defendant reside. In these cases, courts apply the laws and remedies of that state. In contrast to other accident cases, product liability cases often involve resident of different states; in such cases, courts differ on which states' law to apply. Some states use the law of the state where the accident occurred, the lex loci delicti rule (in 1990, 14 states used the lex loci delicti rule; in 2003, only 8 used this rule) (see Scoles, Hay, Borchers, and Symeonides, 2004) . Other states use more flexible rules and consider which state has the most significant contacts with the parties, and the content of the substantive laws of the contact states. In product liability cases, the relevant contacts are the plaintiff's state of residence, the state where the injury occurred, the state where the product was purchased, the state where the product was manufactured, and the principal place of business for the defendant. However, even in multistate products-liability cases, most cases (76%) applied
III. Empirical Evidence of the Relationship Between Tort Reform and Accidental Death Rates
Next, we test the theoretical relationship between tort reform and death rates discussed in Section III. Figure I First, we compare state death rates before and after tort reform and compare death rates in tort-reform states to death rates in non-tort-reform states. Then, we use panel data regressions to more systematically examine the relationship between tort reform and death rates. We also examine the sensitivity of our regression results to alternative specifications. The second column in Table I is the median percentage change in accidental, nonmotor vehicle death rates from two years to one year before each tort reform is enacted.
A. Comparing Death Rates Before-and-After Tort Reform
This column reveals the trend in death rates before each tort reform. The third column is the percentage change in accidental, non-motor vehicle death rates from the year before to the year after each tort reform is enacted. This column reveals the change in death rates when each tort reform was enacted. Death rates decreased in the years that five of the seven tort reforms were enacted: caps on noneconomic damages, caps on punitive damages, a higher evidence standard for punitive damages, allowing evidence of collateral source payments, and prejudgment interest reform. 9 In fact, death rates were increasing in the years prior to the enactment of caps on noneconomic damages, caps on punitive damages, and reforms that allow the admission of evidence of collateral source payments, but began decreasing the year these reforms were enacted.
The results for reforms to product liability and collateral source reforms that offset awards are different; death rates increased in the years after these two reforms were enacted.
second reform was enacted after the first was found unconstitutional), there may be more reforms enacted than states with each reform. 9 The conclusions are the same if the mean percentage change is used, instead of the median percentage change.
Although Table I Specifically, we calculated the average percentage change in death rates in each year, and then compared the change in death rates in each tort-reform state to this average. We present the comparison in the year before and after each tort reform to see how the tort-reform states compared to the average both before and after tort reforms.
Negative numbers in column 2 in Table II indicate that tort reform states had larger-thanaverage decreases (or smaller-than-average increases) in death rates. Positive numbers indicate that tort reform states had smaller-than-average decreases (or larger-than-average increases) in death rates. Table II reveals that tort-reform states experienced larger-than-average decreases (or smaller-than-average increases) in accidental, non-motor-vehicle death rates in the years after five of the reforms were enacted: caps on noneconomic damages, caps on punitive damages, a higher evidence standard for punitive damages, allowing evidence of collateral source payments, and prejudgment interest reform. Prior to three tort reforms, caps on noneconomic damages, a higher evidence standard for punitive damages, and allowing evidence of collateral source payments, the tort-reform states had the opposite relationship with the average; they had experienced smaller-than-average decreases (or larger-than-average increases) in the years before the reforms were enacted.
Once again, the results for reforms to product liability and offsetting awards by the amount of collateral source payments are different; tort-reform states experienced smaller-than-average decreases (or larger-than-average increases) in the years after these two reforms were enacted.
B. Panel-Data Regressions
Although the preceding analysis suggests an impact of some tort reforms on accidental deaths, it controlled for no other factors affecting death rates. To explore the relationship between tort reform and death rates more systematically, we use a state-level, panel data set from 1981-2000. 10 We estimate regressions of the form:
where s indexes states and t indexes time. The left-hand-side variable is the logged accidental, non-motor-vehicle death rate. Z is a vector of state-level controls that includes the unemployment rate, real per capita personal income, the percent of the state population that is African-American, the percent of the state population that belongs to another minority racial group, the percent of the state population that is age 4 or under, the percent of the state population that is age 65 or over, the percent of the state population that is male between the ages of 15 and 24, the per capital alcohol consumption, and the number of hospital beds per capita. The variables and sources are described in the Data Appendix, and Table III We estimate the effects of several different tort reform variables. In the first set of regressions, we estimate a separate regression for each tort reform variable. Our measures of tort reform include the amount of the cap on noneconomic damages, 11 and dummy variables for whether a state has a cap on noneconomic damages, a cap on punitive damages, 12 a higher evidence requirement for punitive damages, product liability reform, reforms to the prejudgment interest rule, reforms that allow courts to offset awards by the amount of collateral source payments, reforms that permit the admissibility of evidence of collateral source payments, or reforms to joint and several liability rules.
Results of the separate regressions are shown in Table IV . The top row of the table presents the coefficients on the tort reform variables.
The coefficient on the amount of the cap on noneconomic damages is positive and significant. This indicates that a cap with a lower dollar limit, or a more stringent cap, is associated with lower death rates. Similarly, the coefficient on the dummy variable for whether a state has a cap on noneconomic damages is negative and significant, indicating that enacting a cap on noneconomic damages is associated with lower death rates. The coefficients on the four dummy variables for whether a state has a cap on punitive damages, a higher evidence requirement for punitive damages, product liability reform, 11 For the variable measuring the amount of the cap on noneconomic damages, states with no caps are assigned values equal to one dollar more than the highest cap ($875,001). This variable is meant to represent the maximum amount a potential tortfeasor would expect to pay in damages. Thus, for states with no caps, this variable could actually take on values near infinity. To be more realistic about how much potential tortfeasors expect to pay, and to not bias the results by assigning huge values to no-cap states, we assign values only slightly higher than the cap states. Assigning even larger values does not change the sign or significance of the results. 12 We do not have a variable measuring the amount of the cap on punitive damages because the state rules vary widely and apply in different situations and with different conditions. or reforms to the prejudgment interest rule are also negative and significant. This indicates that these tort reforms are also associated with lower death rates.
The coefficients on the two collateral source reform dummy variables are positive and significant. This suggests that modification and abolishment of the collateral source rule are associated with higher death rates. This is an interesting result; Klick and Stratmann (2003) find that collateral source reform leads to higher infant mortality rates.
No other reform has consistent results in their paper. Apparently for this variable, the externality increasing effect outweighs the safety increasing effect. Note that other reforms reduce the amount of damage payments for a harmful event, while collateral source reform may lead injurers to paying nothing at all in certain circumstances. Thus, it may not be surprising that this reform has larger injury increasing effects than do others. A more efficient reform might be increased subrogation (in which the injured party's insurance company pays the victim and then collects from the injurer) since this will maintain incentives for internalization.
The coefficient on the dummy variable for reforms to joint and several liability rules is insignificant. To minimize the bias, we estimate another regression that includes all tort reform dummy variables that had a significant relationship with death rates in Table IV . The weakness of this regression is that there may be multicollinearity between some of the tort reform dummy variables, resulting in insignificant coefficients.
The results of the combined dummy variable regression are shown in Table V .
With the exception of the cap on punitive damages, all of the variables maintain the same sign and significance as in the separate regressions. Thus, there is no evidence of any omitted variable bias in most of the separate regressions. The dummy variable for a punitive damages cap may have been significant in the separate regressions because of bias, or it may be insignificant in the combined regression because of multicollinearity.
Nevertheless, the combined dummy variable regression produces more conservative coefficient estimates because it minimizes the possibility of one dummy variable picking up the effect of another dummy variable. Therefore, we use the results of this regression to estimate conservative real-world magnitudes of the tort reforms effects on death rates, summarized in However, some tort reforms are associated with increases in death rates. Reforms that allow courts to offset awards by the amount of collateral source payments are associated with a 5.5 percent increase in the accidental, non-motor vehicle annual death rate, and reforms that permit the admissibility of evidence of collateral source payments are associated with a 2.5 percent increase. Computed over all states and years that had each reform, the coefficients suggest that offsetting awards by collateral source payments has led to 16,486 more deaths and allowing evidence of collateral source payments has led to 4,469 more deaths. The net effect of all tort reforms is a saving of 14,222 lives.
The unemployment rate, the percentage of the population that belongs to a minority group other than African-American, and the per capita number of hospital beds maintain their significant, negative relationships with death rates. The per capita alcohol consumption now has a significant, positive relationship with death rates. The first specification tests whether the results are robust to the elimination of states with high death rates by excluding Alaska from the estimation of equation (3).
C. Sensitivity Analysis
Alaska has the highest accidental death rate of all states; the mean death rate in Alaska is over 7 standard deviations above the population-weighted mean death rate of all states.
Again, the coefficients are identical in sign and significance to the primary results, and only slightly different in magnitude.
It is very unlikely that reverse causation is driving our primary results. 13 That is, it is unlikely that decreasing death rates causes tort reform. Several papers have concluded that the primary drivers of tort expansion and tort reform are the relative power of lawyers and businesses in a state. (This literature is summarized in Rubin, in press). None of the papers have concluded that death rates are important factor. If
anything, increasing death rates should lead to more tort reform: increases in death rates increase tort claims which should motivate potential tortfeasors to fight for tort reform to lower liability damage payments. However, this relationship would cause a bias in the opposite direction of our results: we should find a positive relationship between tort reform and death rates, not a negative one.
Nevertheless, in the second specification, we investigate the robustness of our results to the possible endogeneity of the tort reform variables. In our IV estimation, we -20 -use the following variables as instruments for the enactment of each tort reform: the percentage of the state population voting Republican in each presidential election and the per capita number of people employed in the legal profession. 14 The coefficients maintain their sign and significance, except for the dummy variable representing caps on noneconomic damages that becomes insignificant. Moreover, the coefficients increase substantially in magnitude, suggesting that any endogeneity produces a bias in the opposite direction of our primary results.
The third specification tests the robustness of our results to the type of accidental deaths used as the dependent variable. Our primary regressions estimated the relationship between tort reforms and accidental, non-motor vehicle deaths because motor vehicle deaths are strongly affected by different factors that we do not control for.
Nevertheless, including motor-vehicle deaths in the death rate produces very similar results. All tort reform variables maintain their sign and significance except for the amount of the cap on noneconomic damages, a higher evidence standard for punitive damages, and the dummy variable indicating the admissibility of evidence of collateral source payments in the separate regressions. Even the insignificant reform variables maintain the same sign as in the primary regressions.
We perform a range of other sensitivity tests. The fourth specification in Table   VII presents the results of the tort reform variables with Newey-West standard errors, where the error structure is assumed to be heteroskedastic and possibly autocorrelated up to lag(2). 15 Although the standard errors increase slightly, all tort reform variables maintain their sign and significance except for the dummy variable indicating the admissibility of evidence of collateral source payments in the separate regressions. Next, we estimate equation (3) with the death rate as the dependent variable, instead of the log of the death rate; the coefficients are identical in sign and significance to the primary results. When we include state-specific trends in the sixth specification, the coefficients on three tort reform variables lose their significance in the separate regressions: a higher evidence requirement for punitive damages, product liability reform, and reforms that permit the admissibility of evidence of collateral source payments.
Specification seven excludes all controls except for state and year fixed-effects.
Except for the variable measuring the amount of the noneconomic damage cap and the dummy variable representing this cap, all other coefficients maintain their sign and significance. Lastly, when we perform unweighted panel data regressions, as opposed to population weighted, the coefficients for five of the tort reforms are identical in sign and significance.
IV. Conclusion
The U.S. tort system is a more significant economic factor than the tort system of any other country. It is estimated that the U.S. tort system costs about 2.3% of GDP; for no other country was the amount more than 1.3% of GDP (Italy) and the average for all OECD countries was .9% (Rubin, 1995, using data from Tillinghast-Towers Perrin) . It is an extremely expensive system, and can be justified only if it provides substantial deterrence. 16 Our paper suggests that not only does the tort system not deter deaths, it may actually increase the number of accidental deaths. Although classic law and economics predicts that a reduction in tort liability will increase accidents as potential tortfeasors internalize fewer costs, our empirical evidence suggests the opposite. Tort reforms reduce tort liability by decreasing the number of lawsuits and damage awards.
This allows potential tortfeasors to lower ex ante prices to consumers. If the cheaper goods and services are designed to reduce risk, then tort reform may decrease accidents as consumers buy more protective products.
Several tort reforms-caps on noneconomic damages, caps on punitive damages, a higher evidence standard for punitive damages, product liability reform, and prejudgment interest reform-are associated with decreases in accidental death rates. In contrast, reform of the collateral source rule is associated with increases in accidental death rates. Net, we estimate that the series of tort reforms adopted in the states between 1981 and 2000 have saved a total of 14,222 lives. The results are robust to several alternative specifications.
Our results suggest that certain reforms are needed to make the current tort system more effective. Proponents of tort reform should concentrate on caps on noneconomic damages, caps on punitive damages, a higher evidence standard for punitive damages, product liability reform, and prejudgment interest reform. There should be less attention paid to collateral source reform, although improvements in the subrogation process may be able to eliminate double compensation and preserve incentives for safety.
16 "Thus, the use of the liability system will be socially worthwhile if and only if the savings from accident reduction it brings about exceed its administrative costs. " Shavell, 2004, at 284 .
Voting Data
The data on voting in presidential elections is from The Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections by Dave Leip. The data is available online at: http://www.uselectionatlas.org/. Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. "*" and "+" represent significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Notes: These computations are based on the coefficients from the combined dummy variable regression (Table V) and the average annual populations and average annual death rates in the states that had each reform. Table IV (designated model a which has separate regressions for each tort reform variable), or Table V (designated model b which has one regression that includes all tort reform dummy variables). Standard errors are in parentheses. "*" and "+" represent significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
